This document was printed on recycled paper.
Introduction
One of the most severe nuclear accidents occurred at the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station on March 11, 2011 , following the largest earthquake in recorded Japanese history (magnitude 9.0 on the Richter scale). The epicenter of the earthquake was located 112 miles offshore northwest of the facility. This event triggered a total of seven tsunamis that impacted the site, with a maximum height of 14 to 15 m. Water and debris from the tsunamis overtook a 6-meter-high seawall protecting the site, destroyed off-site power and most backup generators onsite, blocked seawater intakes, and flooded most of the facilities under 4 m of water. An extensive summary of the events surrounding this accident has been provided by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (1).
The TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi Facility consisted of six boiling water reactors (BWRs), with a combined generating power capability of 5480 MWe. At the time of the accident, three of the six reactor units were in operation (Units 1, 2, and 3). The reactor at Unit 4 had been shut down since November 30, 2010, and all of its fuel had been offloaded to the shared spent fuel pool nearby. This pool was the largest spent fuel storage on site, containing 1,331 spent nuclear fuel assemblies or 1.4 times the amount of fuel contained within reactor Units 1 and 3 at the time of the earthquake (1). Units 5 and 6 were also in a planned shutdown, but still had their fuel loaded, reactor pressure vessels installed, and cooling water at normal levels. Units 5 and 6 were successfully shut down without any significant release of radionuclides to the environment (1).
The earthquake initiated automatic scrams for Units 1, 2 and 3, beginning a sequence designed to shut down these reactors safely. This sequence, which is designed to cool reactor cores to a safe temperature, was interrupted, however, upon the arrival of the tsunamis and loss of primary and backup power. With the loss of any heat removal capability, temperatures within the primary containment vessels of Units 1, 2, and 3 quickly rose to >900° C. Pressures in Units 1 and 3 also increased beyond the' design specifications for these vessels due to a chemical reaction (2) (3) between water and the zirconium cladding of the fuel. This reaction occurs at high temperatures and produces H 2(g) (Eq. 1).
→
Eq. 1
This exothermic reaction initiates at ~900° C, but becomes autocatalytic at ~1300° C. Once the pressures within the primary containment vessels of Units 1 and 3 exceeded design specifications, the decision was made to vent the H 2(g) and any other volatile gases that had built up within the primary vessels to the atmosphere in an attempt to protect the structural integrity of the primary containment vessels (1). The first of a series of venting operations occurred roughly one day after units 1, 2, and 3 were scrammed (March 12, 1440 JST). Hydrogen gas released from the primary vessels of Units 1 and 3 subsequently accumulated within the superstructures above the core and eventually lead to a series of explosions. One of the explosions occurred at the spent-fuel pool at Unit 4, and is thought to be a result of H 2(g) that backed up and accumulated there from common piping connecting units 3 and 4 (1).
There is some debate over the source and extent of radionuclide contamination to the environment from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear facility. It has been suggested, for instance, that the explosion at the Unit 4 cooling pool, which is not contained within any primary containment system, may have damaged fuel and contributed to or even composed the major source of the release of radionuclides to the environment (4) (5) . This was based upon a correlation in time observed between the application of water over the spent fuel pool and a decrease in the atmospheric plume measured over Europe.
However, large amounts of radioactive contamination detected across the site (6), as well as trace levels of radiation detected across the Northern hemisphere (7) were also correlated in time with the venting of Units 1 and 3.
Here, we evaluate the earliest reported measurements (within 20 days after the earthquake) of several radionuclides found within environmental samples taken from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear facility (8) .
The purpose of this effort was to attempt to identify the source term, reconstruct the release mechanisms, estimate the extent of the release, and generally demonstrate the power of rapid evaluations based upon basic chemical and nuclear engineering concepts for purposes of consequence management.
Methods

Data Quality
Evaluations provided here were based upon analytical results reported on the TEPCO website (8) posted roughly 20 days after the earthquake. Some of the data we have used were subsequently removed from the website for reasons we assume were related to quality concerns stemming from the rather unique and short-lived nature of these isotopes. However, it is precisely the short-lived nature of these isotopes that make them powerful signatures of the state and identity of their source. Cs). Based upon this review we cautiously defend our use of these data for qualitative assessments regarding the source. We assert no assurances with regards to the quality of these data or the evaluations we have generated beyond their use in assessments of a qualitative nature. Certainly, more thorough assessments of this accident will eventually be available from which to compare the results of this rough-but-rapid evaluation.
Conceptual Model for the Release of Radionuclides from the Primary Containments of Units 1 and 3 and cooling pool from Unit 4
Two possible sources of radionuclides released to the environment from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear facility have been suggested; these include venting of scrammed Units 1, 2 and 3, and uncontrolled releases from damaged fuel located within the central cooling pool at Unit 4. Figure 1 provides a graphical overview of the assumed mechanism for radionuclide release from the vented Fukushima Daiichi Units 1 and 3. The mechanism involves five steps: 1) volatilization of radionuclides within the fuel matrix, 2) migration of those volatile species through the interstices of the fuel to the cladding wall, 3) escape of the volatile radionuclides through damaged portions of the cladding, 4) bubbling of those volatile contaminants through the confined coolant during venting, and 5) migration of these radionuclides to the environment. In our evaluation of the reported data, we make the following conservative, simplifying, assumptions:
1. The volatility of all radionuclides of interest is adequately described by assuming thermodynamic equilibrium (9) . Kinetic limitations associated with phase transformation are assumed unimportant. 2. Any gaseous radionuclides that have evaporated within the fuel completely migrate to the cladding walls. Kinetic limitations associated with migration through the fuel matrix are assumed to be insignificant. 3. Any volatile radionuclides that have migrated to the cladding wall will escape across the damaged cladding wall. In other words, the cladding is assumed to be sufficiently damaged as to pose no significant barrier to escape. 4. All coolant within Units 1 and 3 has evaporated prior to venting, such that volatile radionuclides are released directly into the atmosphere without fractionation due to partitioning into a retained aqueous phase. 5. All volatile radionuclides released during venting immediately condense upon cooling and mixing with the atmosphere, and precipitate without significant fractionation to the surface soil at close distances from the source. The assumption that no fractionation had occurred between differing elements from the point of release to the point of measurement is likely only valid at short distances from the source.
Explosions at Unit 4 suggest the possibility of the dispersal of radionuclides from the irradiated fuel stored within the cooling pool of Unit 4. In order to assess radionuclide release to the local environment from this source, we assume that no fractionation of isotopes has occurred from the point of release to the point of measurement. When evaluating measurements of cesium within water from the cooling pool or sub-drains in close proximity to the pool, we assume a significant fraction of the inventory of the highly soluble cesium isotopes within the damaged fuel ends up dissolved in the water, whether these isotopes were explosively released as part of a fuel fragment or evolved during extreme overheating. reed press 4% to ams ycles fuel ories odel Unit st recent fuel to represent the entirety of fuel assemblies contained within the spent fuel pool has the effect of dramatically overestimating the potential contribution of radionuclides coming from this source.
Results
Analytical results of environmental surveys taken from across the Fukushima Daiichi facility grounds and published on the TEPCO website within the first 20 days after the earthquake are provided in Tables 1  through 3 . Table 4 provides model output from ORIGEN ARP computations designed to replicate the average radionuclide inventories within Units 1 and 3 just before venting and that of the most recently off-loaded fuel stored in the spent-fuel cooling pool at Unit #4. Ba-140 *Fixed Point (FP) 1 -Playground, ~500 m west-northwest of stacks from Units 1 and 2. FP-2 -Forest of wild birds~500 m west of stacks from Units 1 and 2. FP-3 -Adjacent to industrial waste disposal facility, ~500 m south-southwest of stacks from Units 1 and 2. Sampling Point(SP) -4 -Front of administration building for Units 5 and 6, ~1000 m north of stacks from Units 1 and 2. SP-5 -Adjacent to solid waste storage near Units 1 and 2, ~500 m north of stacks from Units 1 and 2. SP-6 -~500 m south-southwest from stacks of Units 1 and 2. SP-7 -~750 m south-southwest from stacks of Units 1 and 2.. SP-8 -~1000 m south-southwest from stacks of Units 1 and 2.. 
Evidence of Minor Amounts of Plutonium Released to the Environment
Reports have suggested that plutonium was released from these reactors based upon total plutonium activity measurements in surface soil (8) . However, Hirose et al. (12) has shown that global fallout deposition rates can vary by 50% or more at the same location of measurement. As such, the use of absolute activity or deposition rates to soil is of qualitative value at best as an indicator of source identity.
An excerpt from T. Sekiguchi (13) Pu activity ratio = 1.92), the contribution from the damaged reactors to surface soil 28 miles (45 km) from the source was estimated to be roughly 16%. Pu activity ratio within the spent fuel at Units 1 and 3 just prior to venting is also shown. The average of the measured ratios in surface soils at the source correlates well with the model estimates of the spent-fuel inventory from Units 1 and 3, and is significantly different from the ratio measured from global fallout for the region. This indicates that plutonium was released to the local environment during the venting of Units 1 and 3. Additionally, the 238 Pu/ 239, 240 Pu activity ratio decreases with distance from the source, indicating the majority of the plutonium contamination from venting the reactors appears to be localized within a few tens of kilometers from the site. A simple model shown in Equation 2 was developed and fit to the experimental data to describe the deposition of plutonium with distance from the site: Table 4 nged from ab ed from the r sation and de Cs activity ratio within the spent fuel and that found in the close-in fallout within the soil provides a measure of the fraction of the total plutonium inventory that escaped from the damaged reactors relative to that of cesium. Based upon a comparison of modeled and measured 239, 240 Pu/
137
Cs activity ratios it is estimated that less than 0.002% of the total plutonium inventory from Units 1 and 3 was released to the environment as a result of the Fukushima disaster.
Relative Release Fractions of Fission and Activation Products Trends with Volatility
Radionuclides other than cesium and plutonium were also detected within the soil at the Fukushima Daiichi Power Station soon after the disaster and provide some independent confirmation of the estimated fraction of the total plutonium inventory released from Units 1 and 3. Cubicciotti and Sehgal (9) Error! Bookmark not defined. have suggested that under nuclear-accident conditions the chemistry within a primary containment vessel is adequately described assuming thermodynamic equilibrium. At these high temperatures under a normal atmosphere, often the most stable form of an element will be its oxide form. However, the environment within the primary containment vessel will also become strongly reducing as H 2(g) builds up from the high-temperature reaction between the fuel cladding and water (15) . This means volatilization can occur directly from the oxide form within a damaged primary containment vessel if temperatures within the vessel exceed the boiling point of the oxide, or indirectly if the buildup of H 2(g) is sufficient to reduce the oxide into a more volatile form. The metallic form of barium, for instance, is more volatile than its oxide form (10). Hobbins et al. (16) has used the Gibbs Free Energy of Formation (∆ ) for the oxide form of a metal (a.k.a., the oxygen potential) as a rough measure of that element's volatility under extreme nuclear accident conditions. Assuming chemical thermodynamics alone dictated the overall release mechanisms of radionuclides from the primary containment vessels to the close-in environment (see Figure 1 and earlier discussion), one might expect a correlation between the relative fraction of an isotope released from the vented reactors and the ∆ for the oxide form of the element it represents. Table 5 provides a summary of the applicable ∆ values from the literature. Figure 4 plots these values against the fraction of the isotope released, which was defined as the ratio of the measured activity of an isotope within surface soil relative to 137 Cs over its predicted activity inventory relative to Tc were assumed to be in metastable equilibrium with their parent.
From Figure 4, 140 Ba(La) is an obvious outlier from a relatively good trend observed for most other vented radionuclides and indicates a larger fraction of this isotope was released than would be predicted assuming the oxide form dictated volatility. Enhanced volatility of 140 Ba has been observed during experiments designed to replicate extreme accident conditions when H 2 /H 2 O ratios exceeded 100 (9, 15, (17) (18) , suggesting that little or no steam remained within the primary containment vessels prior to venting. These observations have been attributed to the fact that barium is one of the few elements whose metallic form is more volatile than its oxide form (10) . These findings warrant the exclusion of 140 Ba data from the empirical model in Figure 4 . Table 5 . Gibbs Free Energy of Formation (∆ ) for select oxides at 1000K (16, (19) (20) Ba released suggested that all coolant from within the primary containment vessel had evaporated prior to venting. The estimated fraction of the total inventory released of the more volatile elements (tellurium, cesium, iodine) within the spent fuel from the vented reactors indicated the damage to fuel bundles was likely extensive, minimizing any potential containment by physical transport of these species through the fuel matrix and across the cladding wall. 238 Pu/ 239, 240 Pu ratios close-in and up to 45 km from the facility indicated that the damaged reactors were the major contributor of plutonium to surface soil at the source, but also that this contribution likely decreased rapidly with distance from the facility. The fraction of the total plutonium inventory released from Units 1, 2 and 3 was estimated to be ~0.003%, relative to the assumed total release of 137 Cs, based upon plutonium/cesium isotope ratios relative to the within-reactor modeled inventory prior to venting. This was also consistent with an independent model evaluation that considered chemical volatility based upon measured fission product release trends. Volatile radionuclides with high activities within the spent fuel at the time of venting have been identified. Seven of the twelve most active isotopes predicted to be residing within the environment after 300 d (including Te) have gone undetected thus far, possibly due to difficulties in their measurement or potential inaccuracies with the model presented here. Until these inconsistencies are addressed, we offer these isotopes as potential analytes of concern for future environmental surveys around the site.
